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BATSON ETHICS FOR PROSECUTORS AND TRIAL
COURT JUDGES
SHERI LYNN JOHNSON*

It was easy for everyone-or almost everyone-to act appalled

when a videotape of a jury selection training session for Philadelphia
prosecutors was released to the public. That videotape showed Jack
McMahon, erstwhile rival of Lynne Abraham, the incumbent District
Attorney for the city of Philadelphia, urging fledgling prosecutors to
avoid seating poor African Americans as jurors.' Not only was the
action he advocated clearly unconstitutional under Batson v. Kentucky, 2 as any minimally informed prosecutor would have known, but
its purported rational was also phrased offensively, making ample use
of stereotypes about uneducated African Americans, African Americans from the South, and young African-American women.
Far be it from me to defend Mr. McMahon. He certainly deserves censure for openly flouting the Supreme Court's command and
for his obvious disrespect for citizens whose interests he is sworn to
protect. Still, I think the story as it played out in the newspapers
missed the larger truth: While the incident was certainly outrageous,
it was not unusual. The participation of African Americans and other
racial minorities in criminal cases is frequently eliminated or minimized for reasons that have more to do with the prospective jurors'
color than their qualifications.
The responsibility for this state of affairs is diffuse. One aspect of
the videotape debacle that received little attention is the apparent
passivity of the audience. Why would all of those attorneys sit and
listen without objection to patently unconstitutional marching orders?
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A., University of Minnesota, 1975; J.D., Yale
University, 1979. I am grateful to my colleagues Steven Clymer and Stephen Garvey, and to
Richard McAdams for their comments.

1. See L. Stuart Ditzen et al., Avoid Poor Black Jurors, McMahon Said, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, April 1, 1997, at Al.

I use "Black" and "African American" interchangeably throughout this article in deference to
the nomencalture used by Americans of African descent to refer to themselves. I capitalize
"Black" because it denotes racial and cultural identity. I do not capitalize "white" because it is
ordinarily used to encompass a variety of separate ethnic and cultural groups-and because I do
not wish to lend the term any additional emphasis. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage:
Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. Civ. RioHTs Civ. LIB. L. REV. 63, 64

n.7, for a similar practice and rationale.
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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Observers trained in social psychology might see the behavior of these
junior attorneys as further replication of the results of the Milgram
experiments, while law-and-economics scholars might find this yet another unremarkable instance of individual profit maximization. To my
mind, such explanations are too generic to be accurate and, perhaps
not coincidentally, exonerate the other parties who have responsibility
for this and other instances of racially motivated exercise of the peremptory challenge.
Perhaps I am naive, but I do not believe that a large group of
young prosecutors would quietly absorb a lesson from a superior on
the necessity of any other Constitutional violation, such as withholding favorable evidence from the defendant. Although some prosecutors in practice violate Brady v. Maryland,3 which requires such
disclosure, most at least understand the rule imposed by Brady and
acknowledge their obligation to follow it. With respect to Batson,
both the specifics of the obligation and its normative underpinnings
are more ambiguous.
This uncertainty exists not only because Batson is a relatively new
rule, though that is part of the problem. Batson reversed an old rule,
buttressed by a century of lore, intuition, and practice. Consider the
Supreme Court's approach in Mirandav. Arizona,4 which reversed another old rule. The opinion is so detailed in its description of proper
conduct, so explicit regarding the dangers it was redressing, and so
forthrightly prophylactic that it has been criticized as reading more
like a statute than a constitutional ruling. 5 As Part I will describe, the
Supreme Court's treatment of the obligation to abstain from racially
discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge has been a far cry
from the Miranda model. From the beginning, Batson was short on
the details of proper behavior and ambiguous with respect to the nature of the wrong it was redressing. Subsequent cases have failed to
illuminate the specifics of correct behavior, further obscured the reasons to refrain from the prohibited behavior, and resolutely refused to
find sufficient proof of racially discriminatory intent in the egregious
cases.
A large measure of the blame for the persistence and prevalence
of racially motivated peremptory challenges must therefore fall upon
the Supreme Court. Part II will address the dilemmas that the
3. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Prohpylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of
Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rav. 100 (1985).
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Supreme Court's failures have caused for lower appellate courts, both
federal and state, and survey some of the responses that those courts
have crafted to those dilemmas. Although there are some valiant efforts here-some from unexpected locales-many appellate judges
bear substantial responsibility for the wrongful striking of minorityrace jurors in their jurisdictions, for they have acquiesced to it.
Finally, academics such as myself must accept some responsibility
for focusing all of their attention on the rules that appellate courts
should be crafting for the review of Batson cases. As has been observed many times, academics tend to focus on appellate courts and
cases, perhaps because appellate opinions are so much more accessible than the doings of trial courts, and perhaps because, increasingly,
tenure-track academics have little or no personal experience in the
trial courts. This tendency has been exaggerated in the peremptory
challenge literature, of which there is now an enormous quantity, most
of which lauds Batson's spirit while urging more vigorous enforcement
through a variety of stricter reversal rules. Part III attempts to begin a
different dialogue, one focused on what prosecutorsshould ask themselves before exercising a peremptory challenge against a member of a
minority racial group, and, concomitantly, what trialjudges should ask
6
of prosecutors before upholding such a strike or series of strikes. I
propose three questions that I think all ethical prosecutors and trial
judges must address to remain true to their oaths to uphold the Constitution, and examine the effect of asking those questions in the
7
troublesome cases posed in Part II.
I.

LIMITED GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT

The history of peremptory challenge law has been reviewed in
detail in many places. I do not attempt a complete recapitulation
here, but only wish to establish four aspects of that history that presently undermine understanding and enforcement of the prohibition
against racially motivated peremptory challenges: First, the legally
6. I do not mean to suggest that a violation of these proposed rules should subject one to
sanctions; nor do I here address which Batson violations may currently be the subject of discipline. On discipline for Batson violations, see Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Decision After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998).
7. Although the Supreme Court has held that Batson does apply to defense strikes, see,
e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992), I do not here address what defense attorneys
should consider before exercising a peremptory challenge. I postpone that question, largely because the defense attorney's competing Sixth Amendment obligation makes the issue more complicated; I would not, for that reason, apply any of my proposals to them. Moreover, racially
motivated exercises of the peremptory challenge by the defense are a smaller problem, because
demographics more often preclude defense attorneys from racially stacking the jury.
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and institutionally entrenched position of the opposite older rule of
Swain v. Alabama;8 second, the lack of specificity in Batson v. Kentucky9 concerning the proper conduct of prosecutors and trial courts;
third, the Court's blurring and undermining of the rationale that supports the Batson rule in subsequent cases such as Powers v. Ohio10 and
Georgia v. McCollum," which transform the Batson right into one belonging to the struck juror; and finally, the Court's adamant refusal in
Hernandez v. New York' 2 and Purkettv. Elem13 to create any enforceable reversal rules. For the reader that is intimately familiar with peremptory challenge law history and law, such as the prosecutors and
trial judges at with whom this article hopes to start a dialogue, this
section can be skimmed.
A.

Permissive Law and PracticePriorto Batson

The United States Congress prohibited the race-based exclusion
of any qualified citizen from jury service in 1875,14 and in 1880 the
Supreme Court held that a West Virginia statute excluding Black people from jury service violated the Black defendant's right to equal protection. That decision, Strauder v. West Virginia,15 concluded that the
law does not protect equally if "every white man is entitled to a trial
by a jury selected from persons of his own race or color,

. .

.and a

negro is not ....116 Although the Court soon extended Strauder to
the exclusion of grand jurors on the basis of race' 7 and the racially
discriminatory administration of facially neutral petit jury discrimination laws,' 8 the concerns underlying Strauderwere not applied to per-

emptory challenges for another one hundred years. Indeed, even
while the Supreme Court became increasingly solicitous of discriminatory selection of the venire, eventually permitting an inference of racial discrimination to arise upon a simple showing of statistically
significant disparity between venire composition and population pro8. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
9. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
10. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
11. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
12. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
13. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
14. See Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 243 (1994)).
15. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
16. Id. at 309.
17. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
18. See Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883).
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portions coupled with an opportunity to discriminate, 19 it remained
silent concerning the possibility that peremptory challenges could
vaporize gains created for African-American defendants by favorable
venire selection law.
This silence was broken by the Court's decision in Swain v. Alabama,20 which only made matters worse. The Court was unanimous
that no equal protection violation arose from the deliberate peremptory striking of all six Black jurors from Swain's jury. 21 The Court
endorsed racial stereotyping in the exercise of the peremptory challenge by reasoning that although race is normally irrelevant to legal
decisionmaking, in the peremptory challenge context, "the question a
prosecutor . . . must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race
or nationality is in fact partial, but whether one from a different group
is less likely to be."'22 The Court never discussed Strauder'sunderlying
assumption that striking African-American jurors in cases with African-American defendants might lead to more unfairness rather than
less. In hindsight, the Swain opinions are remarkable in their unanimity on the permissibility of striking Black jurors in Black-defendant
cases, particularly because Justice Brennan was already on the Court
when Swain was decided. The unrecognized conflict with Strauder's
rationale and the Court's unanimity on this issue both suggest that the
racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges was extraordinarily well entrenched, at least in 1965 when Swain was decided.
Swain further reinforced the practice of depriving minority-race
defendants of same-race jurors by its only caveat: An equal protection claim would lie only if the defendant could prove that the prosecutor struck Black jurors in every case, regardless of the crime, the
race of the defendant, or the race of the victim. 23 Over the next
twenty years, defendants proved unable to meet this burden, probably
because most prosecutors who were striking Black jurors on the basis
of their race did so "selectively"-that is, only in Black-defendant
cases. Certainly it was not because prosecutors were not engaging in
racially motivated strikes, for they were doing so with great frequency
24
in Black-defendant cases.
19. See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (permitting inference based on a gross

disparity); Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (permitting inference based on a statistical
disparity).
20. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

21. See id. at 222.
22. Id. at 220-21.
23. See id. at 224.
24. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103-04 (Marshall, J. concurring).
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Student commentators harshly criticized Swain 25 and a number of
state court judges dissented in cases that applied it,26 but only two

state courts repudiated Swain's holding by relying on their state constitutions.2 7 Despite numerous certiorari petitions, some in death pen-

alty cases, the Supreme Court refused to revisit Swain until the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Sixth Amendment impartial jury requirement was violated by racially motivated peremptory challenges. 28
B.

The Batson Opinion: An About-Face With No Marching Orders

Despite the Second Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court did not
decide the Sixth Amendment question in Batson,29 but reversed its

opinion in Swain and held that a prosecutor's racially motivated exercise of his peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 Batson rejects both of Swain's central premises, concluding that a prima facie case may be established

without reference to actions taken in other cases, 3 1 and deeming unconstitutional action taken based upon the presumption that Black ju-

32
rors will be partial towards Black defendants.
Unlike Miranda, which gave detailed instructions to the police
officer asked to follow a new and counterintuitive policy, Batson

countermands its prior endorsement of prosecutors' instincts with
nothing more specific than "Don't!" A prosecutor should not strike
jurors based upon their race-but how should she determine whether

a planned strike of a minority-race juror is in fact based upon the juror's race? Given the high correlation of race with economic and cultural differences, when is a strike arguably based upon a characteristic
other than race that a prosecutor acting in good faith should avoid?

Silence.
25. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611, 1659 n.242 (1985) (reviewing the literature).
26. See, e.g., State v. Jack, 285 So. 2d 204, 209 (La. 1973) (Barham, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Martin, 336 A.2d 290, 294 (Pa. 1975) (Nix, J., dissenting).
27. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d
499 (Mass. 1979). For the effect of these decisions on other state courts, see Johnson, supra note
25, at 1659-63.
28. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. grantedandjudgment vacated,
478 U.S. 1001 (1986) (vacating in light of Batson).
29. The Court subsequently held that race-based peremptory challenges do not violate the
Sixth Amendment. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1994).
30. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1986).
31. See id. at 95.
32. See id. at 97.
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The opinion offers no more substantive instruction for trial court
judges. With respect to procedure, the Court instructs trial judges that
the defendant must be offered the opportunity to establish a prima
facie case and that the prosecutor must be given the chance to rebut
it.33 With respect to substance, however, the Court tells trial judges
only that they should consider all circumstances relevant to the establishment of a prima facie case, 34 and that more than assertions of good
faith are needed to rebut an established prima facie case. 35 In contrast, the Miranda opinion provided not only a detailed description of
what the state actor was supposed to do, but also an admonition to the
is "heavy,"
suppression court judge that the burden of showing waiver
36
a characterization clearly calculated to offset old habits.
One might excuse these omissions as flowing from an unexamined assumption that racial motive would be easy to discern, both for
the prosecutor and the trial court, but for the fact that Justice Marshall's concurrence directly challenges such an assumption. Citing
state court examples involving proffered motives of speculations
about family relationships and assertions about demeanor, Marshall
noted that specious facially neutral reasons for striking jurors are easy
to invent and difficult to probe. 37 He also pointed out that the wilfully
recalcitrant prosecutor or the indifferent trial judge was less of an obstacle to Batson's enforcement than the unconsciously racist assumptions and rationalizations that influence even parties with "the best of
conscious intentions. '38 The majority offered no guidance that might
ameliorate these concerns, though it did explicitly reject Marshall's
conclusion that only the abolition of the peremptory challenge would
39
resolve these problems.
Another problematic aspect of the majority opinion lies in its
blurred rationale. Although Batson formally brought peremptory
challenge law in line with venire selection law, it lacked the venire
selection cases' emphasis on the harm that would accrue to Black defendants from the racial cleansing of the jury pool. 40 Batson does
state that discriminatory jury selection violates the defendant's right to
equal protection because it denies him "the protection that a trial by
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id. at 96-98.
See id. at 96-97.
See id. at 97.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id.
See id. at 99 n.22.
See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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jury is intended to secure," 41 but it does not specifically include in this
right the protection against racist decisionmaking by all-white juries as
the Strauder opinion did. Moreover, the Batson opinion appears to
give more independent weight to the harms to the excluded juror and
the community. 42 This diffuse rationale further complicates the tasks
of diligent prosecutors and trial court judges; they cannot resolve
murky application questions by deferring to the interest of the protected party because Batson leaves unclear which party they are obligated to protect.
C. The Batson Progeny: After One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
If Batson itself was a good decision that left many questions unanswered, subsequent Supreme Court cases have all abjured answers,
cabined appellate court reversals, and discouraged further reflection
by ethical prosecutors and trial court judges. A quick look at the
cases expanding Batson's application to white-defendant/Black-juror
cases, 43 civil cases, 44 and defense peremptory strikes45 might suggest
that the Court is very committed to Batson. Those cases, however,
also reveal a concomitant decrease in emphasis on the minority-race
defendant's rights that ultimately detracts from the likelihood of reversals in even egregious cases. Moreover, the two cases that directly
address inferences to be drawn from dubious alternative explanations
of racially exclusionary strikes both disapprove of appellate court reversals of egregious trial court determinations, 46 and therefore are
likely to create inferences that Batson imposes new procedures, but
not new obligations.
1. Broader applications with murkier rationales
Reasoning that only one of Batson's ends was "to protect individual defendants from discrimination in the selection of jurors, ' 47 the
majority in Powers v. Ohio concluded that a white criminal defendant
has third-party standing to object to the violation of the Black
41. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
42. For a more complete discussion of the differences between Strauder's focus on the defendant and Batson's three-pronged approach, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Cul.
ture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 24-25, 31-33
(1993).
43. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
44. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
45. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
46. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
366-67 (1991).
47. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406.
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venireperson'sequal protection right not to be excluded from jury service on the basis of race. 48 The injury-in-fact requirement for thirdparty standing was deemed satisfied because "[t]he overt
wrong ...casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and

indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial of the
cause. ' 49 Justice Scalia's dissent hotly contested this "aggressive resort to third party standing," 50 characterizing this as "[i]njury in perception [that] would seem to be the very antithesis of 'injury in
fact.' "51
From the perspective of the prosecutor or trial judge trying to
determine what she should do, this case may be merely odd, rather

than an additional obstacle to understanding her constitutional duty.
Powers may be read to leave unchanged the obligation to the minority-race defendant created in Batson, simply creating an additional ob-

ligation to the minority-race venireperson in cases with majority-race
defendants. 52 Georgia v. McCollum, 53 however, goes one step further,
and in the course of extending the rationale of Powers to defense exercises of the peremptory challenge, impairs the persuasiveness of Batson and diminishes motivation to probe facially neutral reasons for
strikes that have racially exclusionary effects.
In McCollum, the Supreme Court held that white defendants
could not exercise their peremptory challenges in a race-conscious

manner to eliminate Black jurors.54 First the opinion addresses
whether a criminal defendant's racially discriminatory strike "inflicts
the harms addressed by Batson."5 5 Relying on Powers, the Court reasoned that although the defendant suffered no harm from racially motivated defense strikes, Batson was violated because such strikes
56
caused harm to the juror and the community.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 412.
50. Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism, and
Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 419, 433 (1992).
51. Powers, 499 U.S. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. This itself has some marginal cost in clarity: In a Black-defendant case, should the prosecutor examine his actions with respect to the rights of the Black defendant, the Black juror or
both?
53. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
54. See id. at 68.
55. Id. at 48.
56. The Court then determined that the defendant, despite his adversarial relationship with
the government, is nevertheless a state actor when he exercises the peremptory challenge, due to
his reliance on governmental benefits, his performance of a traditional governmental function,
and the exacerbation of the injury by the incidents of governmental authority. See id. at 51
(quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991)). The Court also
concluded that the state incurred harm when doubt was cast upon the fairness of its judicial
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Thus far, like Powers, McCollum neither furthers nor hinders a
prosecutor's or trial judge's understanding of his constitutional duty
under Batson. It is in answering the last question however, that the
Court's opinion must baffle the diligent and ethical prosecutor or trial
judge. Must "the interests served by Batson... give way to the rights
of the criminal defendant"? 57 The Court declared that extending Batson to defendant challenges will not undermine the peremptory challenge's role in promoting justice, for "[i]t is an affront to justice to
argue that a fair trial includes the right to discriminate against a group
of citizens based upon their race."' 58 Here the Court does not distinguish between the defendants in McCollum, white men who were trying to eliminate all Black jurors, and minority-race defendants, who
might use the challenge to increase the likelihood that a single minority-race jury would serve. Although the defendant has "the right to an
impartial jury that can view him without racial animus," 59 he cannot
use his peremptory challenges to help insure such a jury, for his
(only?) protection against racial animus lies in voir dire.
This is a mystifying pronouncement, given that voir dire law does
not even assure a single question concerning racial bias in cases where
the defendant is accused of committing a violent interracial crime!60
Justice O'Connor objected to this sanguine view of the adequacy of
other measures for eliminating racist white jurors, noting that conscious or unconscious racism can affect the way in which white jurors
adjudicate cases involving minority-race defendants. 6 1 She reasoned
that the use of peremptory challenges to secure some minority representation "may help to overcome such racial bias, for there is substantial reason to believe that the distorting influence of race is minimized
on a racially mixed jury."' 62 Justice Thomas, who concurred in the
judgment, argued that the Court's path departed from the wisdom of
Strauder by rejecting the premise that the racial composition of juries

process, and such a public perception constitutes the injury necessary for third-party standing.
See id. at 55-56.
57. Id. at 57.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 58.
60. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); see also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37-38
(1986) (finding that a constitutional right to voir dire concerning racial bias only extends to
penalty phase of a capital trial involving interracial crime, and is not required to assure fairness
of the guilt phase).
61. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
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may affect outcomes, and erred in putting the rights of the jurors
63
above the rights of the defendants.
Should the diligent prosecutor conclude that in honoring Batson,
he need only respect the juror's interest in his right to serve? But
what if, in the prosecutor's experience, the typical juror does not wish
to serve? Should the trial judge conclude that the appearanceof race
neutrality-to the juror and to the community-is the only thing she
need insure? When O'Connor and Thomas protest that these rulings
will harm minority-race defendants, and the Court does not even specifically address this risk, should prosecutors and trial judges assume
that the majority deems the risk of white racism so negligible that they
need not be considered in the Batson calculus? Or should the majority's silence be seen as conservative decisionmaking limited to the
facts of the case: These white defendants, given the racial composition
of the venire, were adequately protected from racially biased adjudications of guilt, so no calculations regarding the effect of strikes on
racially fair outcomes were necessary. If the latter, why did the Court
not indicate the limits of it holding?
At a minimum, Powers and McCollum, by their silence regarding
defense use of racially inclusive peremptory challenges, cavalierly risk
the interpretation that defendants do not matter as much as jurors and
that the appearance of racial neutrality matters more than racially fair
outcomes. I think it intuitively obvious that in the context of a criminal trial, fairness to the defendant is more morally compelling than is
creating an appearance of neutrality among jurors. Thus, the rationales of cases that expand Batson's scope diminish the apparent moral
weight of the obligation created by Batson. The Supreme Court is
clearly responsible for that diminution and any resulting laxness in the
trial courts. 64
2.

Stingy appellate review and starvation ration advice to trial
court actors
Unfortunately, the two Supreme Court cases that determine the
scope of appellate review of Batson decisions create further disincentives for serious Batson inquiries. In Hernandez v. New York, 65 the
Supreme Court held that, at least in a case with Spanish-speaking witnesses, striking Latino jurors on the basis of their proficiency in Span63. See id. at 61-62 (Thomas, J., concurring).
64. For a full-dress argument of why racially fair outcomes are more compelling than the
appearance of race-neutrality in jury selection, see Johnson, supra note 42.
65. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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ish does not constitute per se racial discrimination. The prosecutor
had struck all four Latino jurors from the defendant's venire-two, he
said, because he was uncertain that they would listen to and follow the
interpreter, given their hesitancy and lack of eye contact when they
said they would listen only to the interpreter. 66 The Supreme Court
described these two challenged exclusions as based on a "subjective
criterion having a disproportionate impact on Latinos, ' '67 but deemed
the reason race-neutral because it did not rest "on the intention to
exclude Latino or bilingual jurors, nor on stereotypical assumptions
about [a suspect class]."'6 8 The trial judge's decision to believe this
facially neutral reason, the Court said, depended largely on an evaluation of credibility, and must therefore be reviewed under the most
deferential "clearly erroneous" standard. 69 Under this standard, all
but three Justices found no error.
I have criticized Hernandez at length elsewhere. 70 At least on the
facts of Hernandez, where there is no indication that members of the
panel without Spanish surnames were even asked about their fluency
in Spanish, 71 I think denominating fluency in Spanish as a race-neutral
characteristic is absurd. I also think the extraordinary deference standard is inappropriate, given Justice Marshall's acute observations concerning the ease of dissemblance and the likelihood of self-deception
regarding racial stereotyping. 72 But my purpose here is not to rehash
the correctness of the appellate standard; rather, I want to note how
the manner of that standard's articulation affects trial court personnel
charged with the initial decisionmaking.
In assessing whether the trial court's determination was clearly
erroneous, the Supreme Court cited six facts that would have supported the trial court's determination that the prosecutor was credible. 73 All of these are extraordinarily flimsy, and only one was even
mentioned by the trial judge as supporting his decision. The first is
demeanor, notoriously unreviewable, and certainly unreliable if the
prosecutor is unaware of his own motives. The second, the prosecutor's unsolicited defense of his challenge, might indicate either good
66. See id. at 356-57.
67. Id. at 370.
68. Id. at 361.
69. See id. at 365-69.
70. See Johnson, supra note 42.
71. See People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 628 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye, J., dissenting)
("[T]here is no indication that any other members of the panel were also asked if they spoke
Spanish."), affid, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
72. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
73. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355-63 (1991).
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faith or a guilty conscience. The third, the "fact" that the prosecutor
"did not know which jurors were Latino," was hardly evidence of the
prosecutor's sincerity because the only source for this "fact" was the
prosecutor's own assertion. The fourth, the only one actually cited
cited by the trial judge, was the Hispanic ethnicity of the victims. This,
however, does not weigh against a race-based strike; the most pernicious form of white racism, a propensity to convict minority defendants based on lesser evidence, 74 provides a motive to strike regardless
of the race of the victim. The fifth and sixth reasons, that only three of
the struck jurors could "with confidence be identified" as Latino and
that two were struck for legitimate reasons, proves nothing given that
the prosecutor struck all even arguably Latino jurors.
What can a trial judge or prosecutor make of this ridiculous list of
"support" for the trial judge's determination that the strikes were not
racially motivated? For the prosecutor who acts in bad faith, the
message is clear: Say something, but don't say race. For the indifferent or racist trial court judge, the message is also clear: Say it wasn't
race. Perhaps the Court assumes there are very few such prosecutors
and trial judges. Perhaps a rigorous appellate review is unnecessary
because most prosecutors and trial judges are not trying to evade the
Supreme Court's commands. What then does the Court offer to guide
the ethical prosecutor and trial judge? Silence.
Should the good prosecutor ask more of himself than a plausible
nonracial excuse? Does the excuse even have to be plausible? Should
an ethical trial judge demand a plausible excuse? Should she ask for
evidence that what is plausible is also true? The Supreme Court's
next foray into that area does not answer either of these questions, but
is similarly conducive to an inference that only formal compliance
with a "Don't say race/Say it wasn't race" rule is required.
The Eighth Circuit had held in Elem v. Purkett75 that when a
prosecutor has cited a facially irrelevant characteristic as the sole basis
for a challenged strike, he is obligated to "articulate some plausible
race-neutral reason for believing [that characteristic] will somehow af'76 It
fect the person's ability to perform his or her duties as a juror.
then determined that the prosecutor's justification that two prospective jurors' mustaches and beards looked suspicious did not constitute
a plausible reason. 77 The Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Johnson, supra note 25, at 1616-51 (reviewing the literature).
25 F.3d 679 (8th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
Id. at 683.
See id.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:475

opinion that chastised the circuit court for collapsing the second and
third steps of a Batson hearing and for "seizing upon" the Supreme
Court's admonition in Batson that the prosecutor's stated reason must
'78
be "related to the particular case to be tried."
Proper Batson procedure, according to the Court in Purkett, consists of a first-step determination concerning the establishment of a
prima facie case, followed by a second step that ascertains only
whether the prosecutor has supplied a race-neutral explanation; this
justification need not, however, be even "minimally persuasive.

' 79

Only in the third step is the persuasiveness of the justification even
relevant, and then it is simply part of the determination of "whether
the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination."80 Moreover, the Court explained, Batson's
reference to the "legitimate" reason that "must be related to the particular case to be tried" is not necessarily "a reason that makes sense,"
but merely a reason "that does not deny equal protection." 8' "Silly or
superstitious" race-neutral reasons need not result in findings of racial
82
motivation.
The opinion does note that in the third step "implausible or fantastical justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts
for purposeful discrimination. ' 83 With respect to what counts as an
"implausible" justification or when an implausible justification should
give rise to an inference of racial discrimination, however, the Court is
silent. Again, there is plenty of comfort for the bad and the lazy, and
still no guidance for the good. Such guidance is especially crucial
when, as here, the prohibited practice is long entrenched and the psychological underpinnings of such race-based generalizations are prevalent, complex, and taboo.
II.

DILEMMAS REFLECTED IN CIRCUIT AND STATE APPELLATE
COURT OPINIONS

Under Batson's third prong, "the decisive question will be
whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed." 4 With precious little guidance from the
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-69 (1995) (per curiam).
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991).
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Supreme Court on the question of what enhances or detracts from
credibility, the lower appellate courts have both tried to develop some
general principals that apply to the assessment of any purported explanation, and struggled with specific reasons that seem especially susceptible to abuse. As we shall see, the diligence invested in this effort
has varied widely.
A.

Detecting the Dissembler (or the Deluded)

Are there signals or circumstances that suggest the inaccuracy of
an explanation apart from its "fantastical" nature? Prior to Purkett,
appellate courts had found four likely candidates, though none command unanimous support.
1. Failure to strike white jurors with the cited characteristic
Whether an explanation could possibly be neutral often "is a
question of comparability. ' 85 Most courts agree that if a prosecutor
cites a single characteristic as the reason for striking a Black juror, and
a white juror accepted by that prosecutor also possesses that characteristic, an inference of pretext arises.8 6 Even on this simple proposition, however, there is not clear unanimity. The Fourth Circuit has
explicitly stated that it has not yet adopted such a rule. 87 Moreover,
some of the decisions by courts purporting to apply this rule draw
remarkable distinctions. In one South Carolina case, for example, the
court upheld the strike of an African-American juror for involvement
short of conviction in a DUI case despite the seating of a white juror
with a DUI conviction!8 8 Or, as a dissenting Virginia judge pointed
out, the difference between the struck Black nursing assistant's job
and the seated white occupational therapist's aide job was a slim basis
85. Devose v. Norris, 53 F.3d 201, 204 (8th Cir. 1995).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 52 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1994); Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 973 (3d Cir. 1993); Roman v.
Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 228 (2d Cir. 1987); Freeman v. State, 651 So. 2d 576, 582 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994); People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 105 (Cal. 1986) (in bank); Gadson v. State, 561 So. 2d
1316, 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Ford v. State, 423 S.E.2d 245, 247 (Ga. 1992); People v.
1992); State v. Collier, 553 So. 2d 815, 818 (La. 1989); CommonHope, 589 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Ill.
wealth v. Mathews, 581 N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); State v. Tolliver, 750 S.W.2d
624, 626-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Belcher, 623 N.E.2d 583, 588 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993);
State v. Forney, 468 S.E.2d 641, 643 (S.C. 1996); Vargas v. State, 859 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. App.
1993, no pet.); Riley v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 508, 509 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
87. See United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 953 n.5 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Spencer v.
Murray, 5 F.3d 758, 764 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding ignorance of Southside Strangler reports sufficient support for strike based upon Black juror's supposed literacy and educational level when
"virtually all of the other members of the jury panel had at least heard something about the
Southside Strangler") (emphasis added).
88. See Sumpter v. State, 439 S.E.2d 842, 844 (S.C. 1994).
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for finding good faith. 89 How many such cases there are is difficult to

discern, for often the opinion simply states in conclusory terms that no
white juror possessed the same characteristic. 90
Although there are many such single-characteristic cases, particularly in Texas and Alabama, the usefulness of this comparability rule
has diminished over time. Newer cases show that prosecutors now

tend to cite a combination of reasons for each challenged strike. Even
if all of the cited characteristics are possessed by at least one seated

white juror, courts often find insufficient proof of discriminatory intent because no single white juror possesses all of the cited traits.9 1
Because a racist prosecutor can simply add traits to a shopping list to

achieve a combination that no white juror possesses, some courts have
viewed shopping-list claims with disfavor. 92 None, however, have invoked a per se rule against such lists, regardless of their length.

2. Assertions that lack support in the record
Many courts have concluded that purported explanations that
lack support in the record require an inference of pretext. 93 The

Fourth Circuit, however, again remains skeptical, and maintains that a
good faith error may have caused a wrong assertion and therefore

need not give rise to an inference of racial motive. 94

An additional complication arises when one of a series of reasons
is invalid, either because it was unsupported by the record or because

it was not racially neutral. At least one court has held that giving one
89. See James v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 396, 399 (Va. 1994) (Hassell, J., dissenting).
90. For example, the court's opinion in Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1997), does
not describe how the death penalty views of seated white jurors differed from those of struck
Black jurors. In fact, they were virtually indistinguishable. For more detail, see Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Race, Respectability, and Truth (forthcoming Yale Law Journal 1998).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 77 F.3d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 1996); Hollingsworth v.
Burton, 30 F.3d 109, 113 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 231-32 (7th Cir.
1992); United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415, 417 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988); Davis v. State, 596 So. 2d
626, 628-29 (Ala. 1992); Lingo v. State, 437 S.E.2d 463, 467-68 (Ga. 1993).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 926 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Alvarado, 951 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698-99 (9th
Cir. 1989).
93. See, e.g., Johnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1990); Garrett v. Morris, 815
F.2d 509, 514 (8th Cir. 1987); Jackson v. State, 594 So. 2d 1289, 1294 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991);
State v. Cruz, 857 P.2d 1249, 1254 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc); People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 112
(Cal. 1986) (in bank); Williams v. State, 574 So. 2d 136, 137 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam); Williams v.
State, 426 S.E.2d 348, 349-50 (Ga. 1993); People v. Mays, 626 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (IU. App. Ct.
1993); State v. Green, 655 So. 2d 272, 289-90 (La. 1995); Conerly v. State, 544 So. 2d 1370, 1372
(Miss. 1989); State v. Patterson, 414 S.E.2d 155, 157 (S.C. 1992); Reich-Bacot v. State, 789
S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. App. 1990, no pet.).
94. See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 367 (4th Cir. 1994).
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false reason makes all other reasons irrelevant, 9 5 and another has held
that the persuasiveness of one proffered explanation magnifies or diminishes the persuasiveness of companion explanations. 96 On the
other hand, the transcript in a case affirmed on appeal reflects that
when the prosecutor gave a reason unsupported by the record, the
trial judge pointed out his error and asked him if he had further
97
reasons.
3.

Inadequate or discriminatory voir dire

Because Batson itself states that a prosecutor's statements and
questions during voir dire are relevant evidence, no lower courts can
disagree; but holdings vary widely on how egregious voir dire conduct
must become before it demonstrates racial motivation. A refusal to
voir dire or a lack of meaningful questioning may give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. 98 Other differences in the examination
of white and African-American jurors are also probative. 99 A prosecutor may not rely upon a response to a question to distinguish a
struck African-American juror from a seated white juror if the prosecutor has not asked the white juror the precipitating question. 100
Three state courts-Alabama, 10 Florida, 102 and Texas' 03-have fre95. See United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
96. See Gamble v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792, 795 (Ga. 1987).
97. See Johnson, supra note 90, at 843-44. These facts are not discussed in the reported
opinion, State v. Howard, 369 S.E.2d 132 (S.C. 1988).
98. See Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 624 (Ala. 1987); Guthrie v. Alabama, 598 So. 2d
1013, 1019-20 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); Colbert v. State, 801 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Ark. 1990); People
v. Hall, 672 P.2d 854, 856 (Cal. 1983); State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 23 (Fla. 1988), overruled,679
So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996); Hill v. State 787 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Tex. App. 1990, pet. granted), affd, 827
S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
99. See Splunge v. Clarke, 960 F.2d 705, 708-09 (7th Cir. 1992); State v. Gill, 460 S.E.2d 412,
416 n.4 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 489 S.E.2d 478 (S.C. 1997); Lewis v.
State, 775 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tex. App. 1989, pet. ref'd).
100. See Devose v. Norris, 53 F.3d 201, 204-05 (8th Cir. 1995); State v. Grate, 423 S.E.2d 119,
120 (S.C. 1992); see also Ford v. Lockhart, 861 F. Supp. 1447, 1464-65 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (finding
that a prosecutor may not rely upon white jurors favorable characteristic when failed to question
Black juror regarding that characteristic), aff'd, 67 F.3d 162 (8th Cir. 1995); cf. United States v.
Scott, 26 F.3d 1458, 1466 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that no inference of discrimination arises from
failure to question white jurors regarding asserted negative characteristic of struck Black juror
where Black juror volunteered information).
101. See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co., v. Gideon, 676 So. 2d 310, 312 (Ala. 1996); Ex parte Bird,
594 So. 2d 676, 683 (Ala. 1991); Moore v. State, 661 So. 2d 770, 773 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994);
Jessie v. State, 659 So. 2d 167, 168 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); Jackson v. State, 594 So. 2d 1289, 1294
(Ala. Crim. App. 1991); Jackson v. State, 557 So. 2d 855, 856 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); Avery v.
State, 545 So. 2d 123, 127 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); Williams v. State, 548 So. 2d 501, 508 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1988); Floyd v. State, 539 So. 2d 357, 362 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); Acres v. State, 548
So. 2d 459, 473 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
102. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 574 So. 2d 136,137 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam); Gadson v. State,
561 So. 2d 1316, 1318 (Fla. 1990); Haile v. State, 672 So. 2d 555, 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
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quently held that the failure to voir dire on a characteristic or association from which the prosecutor claims to infer an unfavorable attitude
warrants discrediting the reasoning as pretextual.
4. Lack of a case-specific reason
In Purkett v. Elem, the Supreme Court criticized the Eighth Cir-

cuit for "seizing upon" Batson's statement that the prosecutor's stated
reason must be "related to the particular case to be tried."''

4

Prior to

Purkett, such "seizures" were common in a number of courts; at least
ten states had so held. 10 5 Since Purkette, a Florida intermediate appel-

late court has held that Florida's constitution is more demanding than
the federal Constitution, at least with respect to silly or superstitious
reasons, 10 6 and a South Carolina intermediate appellate court has
questioned whether the earlier case-specific standard will be adopted
°7
as a matter of state constitutional law.1
B.

Identifying Surrogates and Pretexts

It should be clear by now that relatively few cases will be reversed on appeal because of the foregoing generic rules for discerning
dissembling and self-delusion. Once a prosecutor has read a few of
the comparability cases, she can easily avoid reversal based on a simi-

larly situated white juror simply by adding more reasons-either because a complex of reasons truly explains her choice or because she
Bernard v. State, 659 So. 2d 1346, 1348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Stroud v. State, 656 So. 2d 195,
197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Reeves v. State, 632 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); St.
Louis v. State, 584 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Mayes v. State, 550 So. 2d 496,
498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
103. See, e.g., Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509, 511 (8th Cir. 1987); Emerson v. State, 851
S.W.2d 269, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Vann v. State, 788 S.W.2d 899, 905 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990); Musick v. State, 862 S.W.2d 794, 801-02 (Tex. App. 1993, no pet.); Esteves v. State, 859
S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex. App. 1993, no pet.); Chivers v. State, 796 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex. App.1990,
pet. ref'd); Somerville v. State, 792 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. App. 1990, no pet.); Smith v. State, 790
S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. App. 1990, no pet.); Hill v. State, 775 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tex. App. 1989, no
pet.); Lewis v. State, 775 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Tex. App. 1989, pet. ref'd); Daniels v. State, 768 S.W.2d
314, 317 (Tex. App. 1988, no pet.).
104. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768-69 (1995) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986)).
105. See People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 107 (Cal. 1986) (in bank); St. Louis v. State, 584 So.
2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Chunn v. State, 435 S.E.2d 728, 730 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993);
State v. Collier, 553 So. 2d 815, 820 (La. 1989); Chew v. State, 562 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Md. 1989);
Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 630, 632 (Miss. 1988); State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987); People v. Bozella, 556 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Whitsey v. State,
796 S.W.2d 707, 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Walker, 453 N.W.2d 127, 134 (Wis. 1990).
106. See Haile v. State, 672 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
107. See State v. Gill, 460 S.E.2d 412, 415 n.3 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995), vacated on other grounds,
No. 24670, 1997 S.C. LEXIS 158, at *1 (Oct. 1, 1996).
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knows how to get away with discrimination. She will be careful to
elicit enough information about each juror to provide a basis in the
record for citing enough characteristics to explain her choices and
thereby also avoid being accused of desultory voir dire. If she need
not provide a case-specific reason, she should have an easy time justifying both legitimate and illegitimate strikes, whichever she is inclined
to make.
It will not be so easy if the characteristics that most often distinguish Black jurors are deemed surrogates for race. Nor will it be so
easy if many common characteristics are deemed so inconsequential
as to be pretexts. After Hernandez and Purkette, appellate findings of
race surrogates and pretexts are likely to be rarer. Here, however, I
survey past appellate treatment of some of the most troubling explanations not to predict or advocate future reversals, but to indicate the
array of difficult determinations that face prosecutors and trial judges
who are trying to do the right thing despite the lack of appellate
guidance.
Any selection or organization of troubling traits is arbitrary, but I
shall address four general categories: personal characteristics, such as
age, appearance, and demeanor; education and employment; associations, such as family, friends, organizations, and neighborhood; and
asserted beliefs and prior behavior. Within each category, there are
both easy and hard cases, but I postpone for Part III a scheme for
sorting them.
1. Personal characteristics
Age and gender are probably the easiest characteristics to cite
because of their salience and ubiquity. Citing gender is now precluded because of the Supreme Curt's ruling in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. TB.,10 8 but courts often uphold age-young, old, or similar to the
defendant's-as a race-neutral and sufficient reason, 0 9 unless it runs
afoul of the comparability rule. There are exceptions: Alabama
courts repeatedly refuse to accept age without a showing of age-re108. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
109. See, e.g., United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 953 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Ferguson, 935 F.2d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321,
325 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 104-05 (4th Cir. 1988); Goodson v.
Commonwealth, 467 S.E.2d 848, 858 (Va. Ct. App. 1996); Johnson v. Commonwealth, No. 094194-1, 1995 WL 452367 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1995).
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lated bias, 110 and other isolated decisions reject it as a sufficient
explanation."'
Prosecutors frequently cite personal appearance as the reason for
a strike, and courts have upheld many seemingly irrelevant physical
traits with little scrutiny. For example, a "pretty girl" was struck because of a supposition that she might be attracted to the defendant or
his attorney."12 A "muscular build" was the basis of another strike
deemed permissible because, as the prosecutor explained, a muscular
build may reflect feelings of inferiority. 1 3 Wearing a crucifix also provided a reason to strike,"14 as did wearing a Malcolm X cap, 1 5 or simply "look[ing] familiar" to a detective." 6 Appellate courts have
upheld as race-neutral and nonpretextual bases for strikes: having lost
teeth (because the defendant had also lost teeth and this might provide a basis for sympathy), 1 7 wearing "flashy" clothing, 1 8 resembling
the defendant, 1 9 or his mother, 20 chewing gum, 12' being overweight, 22 wearing a large gold watch, 2 3 or having a "bad

appearance. "124
On the other hand, a few courts have scrutinized justifications
involving physical characteristics with more suspicion. A Georgia
court determined that striking an African-American woman because
she had a gold tooth was based upon impermissible racial stereotyping,12 5 and Massachusetts has held that strikes based upon supposed
110. See, e.g., Kynard v, State, 631 So. 2d 257, 268-70 (Ala. Crim.App. 1993); Avery v. State,
545 So. 2d 123, 127 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); Williams v. State, 548 So. 2d 501, 506 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1988); Floyd v. State, 539 So. 2d 357, 363 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
111. See, e.g., People v. Thornton, 628 N.E.2d 1063, 1066 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993); State v. Butler,
731 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
112. See Hernandez v. State, 808 S.W.2d 536, 544 (Tex. App. 1991, no pet.).
113. See Maxey v. State, No. A14-90-00793-CR, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 765, at *7-8 (Tex.
App. Mar. 19, 1992, pet. ref'd).
114. See James v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 396, 397-98 (Va. 1994).
115. See United States v. Hinton, 94 F.3d 396, 396-98 (7th Cir. 1996).
116. See Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 409 S.E.2d 476, 483 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
117. See Culbreath v. Zimmerman, No. 86-7034, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6352, at *8 (E.D. Pa.
May 9, 1991).
118. See Stanford v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Ky. 1990).
119. See United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1988).
120. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 555 N.E.2d 884; 567 N.E.2d 884, 885-87 (Mass. App. Ct.
1990), rev'd, 567 N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 1991).
121. See Webb v. State, 840 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. App. 1992, no pet.); Maxey v. State, No.
A14-90-0793-CR, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 765, at *7-8 (Tex. App. Mar. 19, 1992, pet. ref'd).
122. See Powell v. State, 837 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. App. 1992, pet. ref'd); Maxey, 1992 Tex.
App. LEXIS 765, at *4-5.
123. See United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 494, 496-97 (8th Cir. 1992).
124. Holton v. State, 590 So. 2d 914, 916 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
125. See Rector v. State, 444 S.E.2d 862, 865 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
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resemblance to the defendant's mother are not race-neutral. 126 A
Texas court used a broad definition of comparable white jurors in determining that striking an African-American defendant for an ostensibly "strange" haircut was impermissible when a white juror with a
different, but also unusual haircut was allowed to serve.' 27 Initially,
an intermediate Virginia appellate court reasoned that striking a juror
for wearing a jacket with the logo of Virginia State University (a
predominantly African-American institution), with no explanation as
to why it was objectionable, was impermissible. 128 On rehearing, how29
ever, the court was more gullible, and upheld the strike.'
Although careful scrutiny of physical characteristic justifications
is unusual, the response to strikes based on a juror's purported demeanor has been more varied. Numerous cases uphold a variety of
justifications for a strike: inattentiveness (in this case three Black jurors were claimed to exhibit the problematic demeanor),' 30 looking
tired, 13 ' appearing to doze, 132 staring at the prosecutor, 133 appearing

too independent (as evidenced by a rigid carriage and obstinate manner of answering questions), 134 acting hostile to the prosecutor, 35 gig-

138 or strong 139
gling, 136 appearing to be untruthful, 137 having a weak
personality, or immaturity. 140 On the other hand, Florida 14 1 and
Texas 142 have reversed reliance on demeanor reasons absent specific

record support for them, and Alabama has frequently found such de126. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 567 N.E.2d 899, 904-05 (Mass. 1991).
127. See Woods v. State, 801 S.W.2d 932 ,936-37 (Tex. App. 1990, no pet.).
128. See Buck v. Commonwealth, 415 S.E.2d 229, 232-33 (Va. Ct. App. 1992), reh'g en banc
granted and rev'd, 432 S.E.2d 180 (Va. App. 1993).
129. See id.
130. See United States v. Sherrills, 929 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1991).
131. See Branch v. Commonwealth, No. 1580-93-2, 1995 WL 3284, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 3,
1995), reh'g en banc granted Mar. 6, 1995.
132. See Mitchell v. State, 579 So. 2d 45, 49 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
133. See People v. Finley, 584 N.E.2d 276, 284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Maxey v. State, No. A1490-0793-CR, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 765, at *7-8 (Tex. App. Mar. 19, 1992, pet. ref'd).
134. See Washington v. Johnson, 90 F.3d 945, 954 (5th Cir. 1996).
135. See Maxey, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 765, at *4-5.
136. See People v. Powell, 586 N.E.2d 589, 594 (I11.App. Ct. 1991).
137. See Stephens v. State, 580 So. 2d 11, 20 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
138. See State v. Otis, 586 So. 2d 595, 602 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
139. See Green v. State, 839 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Tex. App. 1992, pet. ref'd).
140. See Tharpe v. State, 416 S.E.2d 78, 81 (Ga. 1992).
141. See, e.g., Bernard v Sate, 659 So. 2d 1346, 1348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Mincey v.
State, 644 So. 2d 1039, 1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Warren v. State, 632 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Givens v. State, 619 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
142. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 796 S.W.2d 813, 819 (Tex. App. 1990, pet. ref'd); Smith v. State,
790 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. App. 1990, no pet.); C.E.J. v. State, 788 S.W.2d 849, 858 (Tex. App.
1990, pet. ref'd).
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meanor reasons insufficient to support a strike. 143 A few other courts
have urged trial courts to make specific findings concerning demeanor
allegations. 144 One final personal characteristic bears special notice:
ascriptions of low intelligence-despite the ease with which they may
be made and the conformity with degrading stereotyes-usually are
upheld. 145
2.

Employment and education

Unemployment, when supported by the record 146 and applied

evenhandedly, is frequently cited and universally upheld as a legitimate, race-neutral basis for a strike. 147 Courts often also uphold
strikes based on unstable employment. 48 Appellate response has
been mixed with respect to whether one may assume a negative attitude toward the prosecution from a particular job or occupation.
"Sympathetic" occupations have been held to justify a strike, 149 and
being a student has been held reason enough to assume tolerance of

drugs, and thereby justification for a strike. 150 In contrast, Alabama
143. See, e.g., Sims v. State, 587 So. 2d 1271, 1277 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (disallowing strike
of allegedly soft-spoken juror with communications difficulties); Moss v. Montgomery, 588 So.
2d. 520, 526 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (disallowing strike for purported laughter); Williams v.
State, 548 So. 2d 501, 508 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); Madison v. State, 545 So. 2d 94, 97 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1987) (disallowing strike for inattention, disinterest, body language, and sleeping during
voir dire), affd, No. CR-93-1788, 1997 WL 15342 (Ala. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 1997).
144. See United States v. Diaz, 26 F.3d 1533, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994); Chew v. State, 562 A.2d
1270, 1277 (Md. 1989); Hatten v. State, 628 So. 2d 294, 298 (Miss. 1993).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1992); Tharpe v. State, 416
S.E.2d 78, 81 (Ga. 1992); McCarr v. State, 397 S.E.2d 711, 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Allen v.
State, 811 S.W.2d 673, 676-77 (Tex. App. 1991, pet. ref'd); Jones v. State, No. 01-89-00537-CR,
1990 Tex. App. LEXIS 2135, at *7 (Aug. 23, 1990, pet. ref'd).
146. Cf. People v. Thronton, 628 N.E.2d 1063, 1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding record evidence of unemployment for only two months insufficient to support a strike).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1049 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Ferguson, 935 F.2d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); United States v. Welch, No. 90-5182,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 7132, at *2 (4th Cir. Apr. 24, 1991); United States v. Pressley, No. 903190, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4356, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 1991); United States v. Peete, 919
F.2d 1168, 1179 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ross, 872 F.2d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam); United States v. Allen, 666 F. Supp. 847, 852 (E.D. Va. 1987); State v. Green, 409 S.E.2d
785, 787 (S.C. 1991); Goodson v. Commonwealth, 467 S.E.2d 848, 858 (Va. Ct. App. 1996); State
v. White, No. 91-1878-CR, 1992 Wis. App. LEXIS 278, at *5 (Mar. 18, 1992).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 949 F.2d 973, 979 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Valley,
928 F.2d 130, 136 (8th Cir. 1991); State v. Hernandez, 823 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991);
People v. Williams, 574 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); State v. Robinson, 409 S.E.2d
404, 407 (S.C. 1991); Green v. State, No. 01-81-00529-CR, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 1722, at *23
(July 11, 1991, no pet.); Maxey v. State, No. A14-90-00793-CR, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 765, at *6
(Mar. 19, 1992, pet. ref'd).
149. See James v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Va. 1994).
150. See State v. Richburg, 403 S.E.2d 315, 317 (S.C. 1991).
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refuses to permit any generalizations based upon occupation, 151 and
Florida 152 and Texas 1 53 insist that any presumed occupational predisposition must be explored on voir dire or else deemed pretextual.
Other courts, while espousing no general rules, have found particular
examples pretextual, such as presumed anti-prosecution bias from
55
hospital administrators,'154 strikes based on federal employment,'
strikes of postal workers,' 56 strikes based on prior military experience
(allegedly likely to cause nervousness) 157 and, thank goodness, strikes
based on employment in an occupation beginning with the letter
,,p,,!158

When a limited education is asserted to explain a strike, many
courts are satisfied. 159 The Fifth Circuit, however, has acknowledged
that lack of education, because of its racist roots, might in some cases
be impermissible grounds to strike, but found it race-neutral in a case
where a complex conspiracy was involved. 60 Two courts have found
that particular forms of education-martial arts training' 6' and prelaw courses16 2-may justify strikes.
3.

Associations

Family associations often pose no issues at all, and may even rise
to the level of a for-cause challenge. Relation to the defendant is the
strongest example. Some family associations, however, are problematic either because of their attenuated nature, their extraordinarily
strong disparate impact, or both. With respect to family associations,
151. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 659 So. 2d 151, 152 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994); Huntley v. State,
627 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), affd, 627 So. 2d 1013 (Ala. 1992); Powell v. State,
548 So. 2d 590, 594 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); Williams v. State, 548 So. 2d 501, 506 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1988); Madison v. State, 545 So. 2d 94, 99 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
152. See, e.g., State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 23 (Fla. 1988); Fernandez v. State, 639 So. 2d
658, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Reeves v. State, 632 So. 2d 702, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994); Stroder v. State, 622 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); House v. State, 614 So. 2d
647, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Gadson v. State, 561 So. 2d 1316, 1318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990); Mayes v. State, 550 So. 2d 496, 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
153. See e.g., Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Musick v. State,
862 S.W.2d 794, 802 (Tex. App. 1993, pet. ref'd); Woods v. State, 801 S.W.2d 932, 936-37 (Tex.
App. 1990, pet. ref d); Chivers v. State, 796 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. App. 1990, pet. ref'd).
154. See People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 110-11 (Cal. 1986).
155. See State v. Price, 763 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
156. See People v. Sims, 618 N.E.2d 1083, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
157. See State v. Belcher, 623 N.E.2d 583, 589 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
158. See United States v. Romero-Reyna, 867 F.2d 834, 838 (5th Cir. 1989).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Mixon, No. 88-0547, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 692, at *6-7 (E.D.
La. Jan. 16, 1992); United States v. Allen, 666 F. Supp. 847, 852 (E.D. Va. 1987).
160. See United States v. Moeller, 80 F.3d 1053, 1060 (5th Cir. 1996).
161. See Brashear v. State, 603 A.2d 901, 904-05 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
162. See State v. Morrow, 467 N.W.2d 63, 70 (Neb. 1991).
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courts have upheld strikes based upon the juror having the same last
name as a defendant the prosecutor had previously tried, 163 a similar
last name to a defendant in an unrelated trial,164 the same last name as
a witness in the case, 165 having no children,'1 66 being a single
mother, 67 coming from a large family, 68 being married to an unemployed person, 169 or even just being a single woman.' 70 Several
courts, however, have viewed strikes based on single status alone as
highly suspect or impermissible,' 7' and one has reversed where the
prosecutor relied upon the juror's unwed motherhood. 172
With respect to less intimate associations, explanations relating to
church affiliation appear to be the most common. Courts uphold
strikes based on membership in Apostolic, 173 Greater New God,174
"fringe,' 75 or other affiliations, 76 as well as for having strong religious convictions 17 7 or "extensive" religious activities, 178 although one

court has drawn the line at Bible reading.' 79 Strikes related to membership in African-American organizations, on the other hand, have
usually been deemed surrogates for race. 180
163. See Cochran v. Howard, No. 89-0138-CB-C, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12711, at *12 (S.D.
Ala. Aug. 16, 1991).
164. See United States v. Tndle, 860 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1988); Alvarez v. State, No. A1491-00232-CR, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 1632, at *8 (June 18, 1992, no pet.).
165. See Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1992).
166. See Buck v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 414, 415-16 (Va. 1994).
167. See Files v. State, 613 So. 2d 1301, 1304-05 (Fla. 1992); People v. Thomas, 559 N.E.2d
262, 263-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); State v. Walker, 843 P.2d 203, 208-09 (Kan. 1992).
168. See People v. Williams, 595 N.E.2d 1115, 1128-29 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992).
169. See People v. Harper, 279 Cal. Rptr. 204, 208 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
170. See United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262-63 (7th Cir. 1991).
171. See United States v. Romero-Reyna, 867 F.2d 834, 836-37 (5th Cir. 1989); Christianson
v. State, 601 So. 2d 512, 514-15 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); Richmond v. State, 590 So. 2d 384, 38586 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); Givens v. State, 619 So. 2d 500, 501-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Commonwealth v. Carelton, 629 N.E.2d 321, 324-26 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
172. See People v. Sims, 618 N.E.2d 1083, 1085-86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
173. See Maxey v. State, No. A14-90-0073-CR, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 765, at *6 (Tex. App.
Mar. 19, 1992, pet. ref d).
174. See State v. Young, 569 So. 2d 570, 578-79 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
175. Alvarez v. State, No. A14-91-00232-CR, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 1632, at *4-7 (Tex. App.
June 18, 1992, no pet.).
176. See United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d 985, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1990); Kemp v. State,
No. 01-85-00501-CR, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 1028, at *4-7 (Tex. App. Apr. 25, 1991, no pet.).
177. See Sistrunk v. State, 599 So. 2d 87, 90 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); People v. Malone, 570
N.E.2d 584, 589-90 (II. App. Ct. 1991).
178. See People v. McArthur, 577 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
179. See Haile v. State, 672 So. 2d 555, 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
180. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 568 So. 2d 335, 336-37 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); Randolph v.
State, 416 S.E.2d 117, 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Moore v. State, 811 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.
1991, pet. ref d); Somerville v. State, 792 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. App. 1990, no pet.); see also
Parker, 568 So. 2d at 336-37 (finding membership in a number of political organizations improper basis for strike).
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Assertions that the juror lives in a bad or crime-ridden neighborhood are also problematic. Courts have upheld the race-neutrality
and relevance of neighborhood on several theories: residents are inured to violence or drugs, 181 residents are more likely to mistrust the
police or to have acquaintances that are involved in illegal activities,182 or most specifically, that the juror lives in the area in which the
crime was committed.' 8 3 The Alabama courts, however, have rejected
all variations of neighborhood arguments. 18 4 More modestly, Massachusetts has found pretextual arguments that juror residence in the
town of the offense or the same town as the defendant. 85 The Ninth
Circuit has rejected the explanation that a juror from a violent, poverty-stricken community is more likely to be inured to violence, reasoning that residence was being used as "a surrogate for racial
stereotypes. "186
Even broader, but less common than neighborhood claims, are
socioeconomic explanations for strikes. At least one court has approved the explanation that the juror was of the same socioeconomic
class as the defendant. 87
4.

Specific attitudes and prior behavior of the juror

Most expressed attitudes and acknowledged prior conduct are
unimpeachable explanations for strikes; it is clearly race neutral to
strike a juror who disagrees with the law or has been violating it herself. Some purported explanations that have been upheld reek (at
least to this reader) of pretext: Not owning a firearm, 188 a twenty181. See, e.g., Newsome v. State, 829 S.W.2d 260, 264-66 (Tex. App. 1992, no pet.); Barksdale
v. Commonwealth, 438 S.E.2d 761, 763-64 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243, 1245-48 (11th Cir. 1991).
183. See United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1550-53 (11th Cir. 1991) People v. Simmons, 569 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
184. See, e.g., Jessie v. State, 659 So. 2d 167, 168-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (finding no basis
for surmise that residence in high crime neighborhood made juror susceptible to intimidation by
gang members); Hemphill v. State, 610 So. 2d 413, 414-16 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (living near
other persons who had been prosecuted no more than a "high crime area" rationale without
relevance to the case); Duncan v. State, 612 So. 2d 1304, 1307-09 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (living
near crime scene inadequate basis for strike absent voir dire concerning knowledge of the area);
Sims v. State, 587 So. 2d 1271, 1276-77 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (finding residence in high-crime
neighborhood not race-neutral reason); Madison v. State, 545 So. 2d 94, 97-99 (Ala. Crim. App.
1987) (insisting that prosecutor must show that juror himself dislikes police rather than surmise
it from neighborhood).
185. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 567 N.E.2d 899, 902-05 (Mass. 1991); Commonwealth v.
Legendre, 518 N.E.2d 872, 873-74 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).
186. United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1992).
187. See Cowan v. State, 579 So. 2d 13, 18-19 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
188. See Lemley v. State, 599 So. 2d 64, 67-71 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); Mock v. State, No. 0891-00406-CR, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 3218, at *32-35 (Dec. 30, 1992, pet. ref'd).
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seven-year-old traffic conviction,189 and being concerned about racism
in the system. 190
III.

ETHICAL SOLUTIONS AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL

I will abjure the usual laments about inadequate policing by the
appellate courts. By now it is clear that policing will neither curb the
defiant prosecutor nor spur the inert trial judge. 191 The Supreme
Court's extreme deference to trial court determinations of racial motivation compels a focus on ethical trial court actors; perhaps this is the
tack that should have been taken first. Certainly it is more efficient to
secure the efforts of trial court personnel than it is to require retrials.
There will always be a reluctance to reverse a conviction because the
costs of retrying any case are high. Trial court actors, not faced with
those costs, can actually afford to be more singleminded in their devotion to the Constitution-if they want to be.
The trick is, of course, to convince prosecutors and trial court
judges that they should be vigilant-and then to be specific about
their obligations. As delineated above, the Supreme Court has failed
miserably here, as have most state courts and commentators. Their
(and our) failures and dilemmas can, however, illuminate the question
of the normative obligations of prosecutors and trial judges. What
should the training course for young district attorneys say about race
and jury selection? What should task forces for racial fairness say to
trial judges about their Batson determinations? 192 Ethical prosecutors
and trial judges are obliged to both uphold the Constitution and seek
justice. In the context of striking racial minorities from the jury venire, I think this has three implications. I hope there might be general
agreement upon the three standards I propose, though I am sure there
will be disagreement about some applications. Even if there is disagreement, however, I think we take a step forward by talking about
what we aspire to at the trial court level, rather than focusing exclusively on how bad trial court behavior must be to be reversed.
189. See Branch v. Commonwealth, No. 1580-93-2, 1995 WL 3284, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 3,
1995).
190. See State v. McRae, No. CI-91-1461, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 554, at *3-4 (Minn. Ct.
App. June 16, 1992), rev'd, 494 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1992).
191. Except for possibly those few vigilant state courts.
192. The National Judicial College trains new judges and has ongoing CLE programs, which
might be an appropriate place to raise these issues.
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What's Sauce for the Goose...

For the prosecutor considering whether he is justified in striking a
racial minority from the venire, the question should be: Would I allow
this person to sit as a juror if she were white? This question cannot be
answered solely with reference to whether he has, in this case, actually
accepted a white juror with the characteristic he is about to cite as the
reason for the strike. Quite often there are no white jurors with the
same characteristic. In answering the question, the honest prosecutor
should consider whether he has in the past struck white jurors because
they possess this characteristic, and with no greater evidentiary support for the conclusion that the juror indeed possesses this characteristic. If he has encountered this characteristic in white jurors before and
not struck them, or cannot recall whether he did, he should abstain
from striking the juror; if he has never encountered this characteristic
(or a closely analogous trait) in a white juror before, he should ask
himself if he is sure he will strike the next white juror with that characteristic (and make a note to do so if he concludes he will!).
93
What if the prosecutor thinks that a combination of unrelated'
reasons prompt his impulse to strike? Unless he can think of a closely
analogous combination of reasons that led him to strike a white juror
in the past, he should not strike the minority juror. Combined reasons
are both more likely to be pretexts and less likely to be compelling, so
avoiding a strike should rarely be very costly-unless of course, it is
the kind of combination that experience has shown to be particularly
damaging to the prosecution, in which case it can be justified with
reference to a prior white juror strike.
The trial judge version of the "Sauce for the Goose" standard is
almost identical: Would the prosecutor strike the juror if she were
white? Often a trial judge will know the answer to that question without further inquiry, based on prior cases tried with this attorney. But
if prior experience does not answer the question, the trial judge
should ask the attorney not whether he has struck a white juror for the
same reason or combination of reasons, but when. With an inexperienced attorney, there may be no bank account to draw upon, but common practice of other senior attorneys in the office (or a training
manual advising such strikes) 194 may provide a kind of credit. When
193. Where several reasons are related-for example, several different replies that each indicate hesitation about drug laws-they may be treated like a single characteristic, prompting the
question: Have I struck a white juror with a similar level of ambivalence about drug laws?
194. Of course, if the training manual listed too many apparently innocuous bases for strikes,
it would not be persuasive.
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an inexperienced attorney is asserting a reason not generally deemed
important by the office, however, the chances that he is either dishonest or self-deluded are relatively high, and the likelihood that this reason is significant to a fair trial for the state is quite small.
The "Sauce for the Goose" rule is the easiest of the three proposals to defend. It is the trial court analogue of the comparability rule,
but it can be much more demanding because both the prosecutor and
the trial judge have access to information on past practices of the
prosecutor. That the defendant may not be able to prove on appeal
that a prosecutor does not strike white jurors for the stated reason
does not mean that the ethical prosecutor is free to strike for that
reason; constitutional law is enforced through burdens of proof, but
constitutional obligations are not defined by them. The standard
matches the constitutional obligation, and the enforcing questions are
the best approximation of rules I can devise to operationalize that
standard. It is true that those rules may occasionally sweep in an innocent strike, but the good prosecutor has an obligation to keep himself informed, and even the most cursory awareness of stereotyping
and unconscious racism suggest that the potential for inadvertent resort to racial considerations is far larger than the overlap in these
rules.
Applying this standard will, I think, preclude most of the strikes
that affront the casual reader. For example, age, marital status, occupation, same or similar names as defendant or other criminals, most
physical appearance characteristics, and most religious affiliations
would not withstand this test, nor would a decades-old traffic offense
conviction or the mere failure to own a weapon.
What should happen if a prosecutor asserts an explanation for a
strike that does not meet this test, but offers other explanations as
well? To take an egregious example, consider the prosecutor who first
stated that he struck a juror because she sat on a civil jury that rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, then added that she had trouble with
circumstantial evidence, then retracted that reason, acknowledging
that other jurors had had the same qualms, and finally said:
[T]he fact that she's got blonde hair.... It's been my personal experience that if somebody is not cognizant of their own reality and
existence and want blonde hair, and they are a black woman, I don't
want them on my jury ....
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I mean, there's nothing in the black heritage, unless they may be
some mulatto, or freak of nature, something like that-would extend to the personality of that person with the blonde hair. 195
This hair explanation does not require further inquiry; by his own
admission, the prosecutor would not have struck a white woman because she had dyed her hair blonde. At this point, the trial court
should disallow the strike. The fact that another possibly neutral explanation has been proffered (service on a civil jury that returned a
verdict for the plaintiff) is irrelevant because the prosecutor has
clearly been influenced by race in his decision to strike.
...

B.

If It Walks Like a Duck and Talks Like a Duck...

Assuming the prosecutor can satisfy herself that she would have
struck a white juror with the same characteristic, she should next ask
herself, "Is this explanation inextricably linked with race or racial stereotypes?" Obviously, prohibiting racial discrimination while permitting skin color discrimination would thwart the purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause; using a surrogate for race is no more permissible
than citing race itself. Even appellate courts have agreed that this
principal requires deeming strikes based upon membership in African-American groups impermissible, but what is the broader principal
for identifying surrogates for race? The only place I know to start is
by scrutinizing characteristics that are closely linked to race through
both disparate impact and stereotypes.
I do not propose that the prosecutor abstain from considering
every characteristic that has strong racial connotations. For example,
criminal convictions for violent crime have both psychological and statistical correlations to race, yet it would be absurd to forbid their use.
What the good prosecutor should ask herself after identifying a trait
closely linked to race is: Does this characteristic track my underlying
concern significantly better than any other accessible trait that has less
of a linkage with race? If the answer to that question is no, then the
characteristic fails the "If It Walks Like a Duck" standard. Notice
that the second question focuses upon other "accessible" traits. It recognizes that there may be better predictors that a prosecutor cannot
discern; for example, actual criminal involvement is probably a better
predictor of anti-prosecution attitudes than is a criminal conviction,
but it is not accessible to the prosecutor. On the other hand, "accessible" also recognizes that prosecutors often could easily acquire infor195.

Davis v. State, 596 So. 2d 626, 628 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
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mation that they do not; rather than presuming racial solidarity with
defendants from attendance at a traditionally Black college or university, a prosecutor could inquire about it.
A trial judge should ask herself these same two questions. Sometimes, before she can resolve the question of accessible alternatives,
she will need to ask the prosecutor what the trait selected is supposed
to probe.
How do these two questions operationalize the race surrogate
prohibition? General equal protection principals certainly commend
them even if they don't precisely command them. Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.196 describes the
factors probative of racial motive, and among those are disparate impact, which is enough standing alone if it is strong enough to consti1 97
tute a "stark pattern, unexplainable on any basis other than race."'
(Some characteristics, such as "high crime neighborhood" approach
this standard.) For characteristics with strong but less than "stark"
disparate impact, Arlington Heights provides a nonexhaustive list of
other indicators of racial motivation: procedural departures, substantive departures, contemporary statements, the exact sequence of
events, and prior history of discrimination. 198 The first question I pose
(Is this characteristic inextricably linked with race or racial stereotypes?) should encompass disparate impact evidence, prior history of
discrimination, and an additional indicator of discriminatory intent,
the cultural meaning of an action.' 9 9 The second question (Does this
characteristic track my underlying concern significantly better than
any other accessible trait that has less of a linkage with race?) sweeps
in substantive and procedural departures: Ordinarily a prosecutor solicits and relies upon the best predictor of an undesirable trait she can
acquire. As with the first standard, the two operationalizing rules for
the second standard are slightly broader than constitutionally commanded, but not in ways that cause any harm to the state. Again, if
we give any weight to the likelihood of either unconscious or covert
racial reasoning, this small prophylactic overreach is too small rather
than too large.
In my view, application of the "Walks Like a Duck" standard
would eliminate reliance on another large subset of the troublesome
196. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
197. Id. at 266.
198. See id. at 267-68.
199. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 355-62 (1987)
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explanations: at least in most cases, the contributions made by neighborhood, education, unwed motherhood, "unstable" employment, and
social class can be probed by less racially charged considerations. Unemployment, at least for a substantial period of time, is more likely to
pass the test despite its disparate impact and association with racial
stereotypes.
Some physical appearance characteristics, such as gold watches
and teeth, braids, muscularity, and probably obesity, would also fail
this standard, though for a different reason: it is difficult to think of
any relevant concern about which they are significantly probative.
Association with Black organizations should likewise fail; I myself am
convinced that wearing a Malcolm X cap falls into this category, for,
at least in the 1990s, I do not think it significantly probative of racial
militancy, and in any event, a prosecutor with such a concern should
inquire about it, at least when the judge will permit such inquiry. Demeanor reasons relating to either hostility or inattentiveness, along
with purported lack of intelligence, should also fail this test in the absence specific indicators of those traits.
Should the citation of one "Walks Like a Duck" reason doom a
strike if other legitimate reasons are cited? Here the question is
closer, and may depend upon the combination. If a prosecutor cites
unstable employment and criminal convictions, I am inclined to think
the strike should be allowed, for the first reason is a close call and the
second is clearly persuasive. On the other hand, if the prosecutor
starts with NAACP membership and adds an unemployed spouse, the
first is clearly a surrogate for race 2°° and the second is dubious on
both surrogacy and probativeness grounds.
C. Justice Is More than Foul Rules (and It's Not for Chickens
Either)
The first two standards come from the Equal Protection Clause
and the overriding duty to uphold the Constitution. The last one
comes from the ethical obligation to do justice, for prosecutors, unlike
private litigants, do not have the primary goal of winning. Doing justice requires more than just avoiding breaking rules set out by appellate courts or law professors or a supervising attorney. For the
200. Of course, not all NAACP members are Black, but because NAACP membership is
overwhelmingly Black, because the NAACP is associated with African Americans in most peoples minds, and because I cannot imagine what legitimate trait it predicts better than some racially associated characteristic, it "Walks Like a Duck."
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prosecutor, doing justice when poised to strike a minority-race juror
means, "When in doubt, don't!"
The long history of racial exclusion from jury service, along with
the concomitant history of racially biased and often wrongful convictions, means that the moral prosecutor, after asking whether his
planned strike satisfies the "Sauce for the Goose" and "Walks Like a
Duck" standards, will pause. If he doubts that he would strike the
same juror were she white, doubts that reliance on this racially
charged criterion is necessary, doubts that he has voir dired in a raceneutral manner, or doubts that he has been completely honest with
himself, he should err on the side of justice. This is particularly true in
jurisdictions where the demographics of the venire mean that the
questionable strike will result in an all-white or virtually all-white jury
for a minority-race defendant. Indeed, some attorneys might decide
that the racially exclusionary consequence of a strike by itself creates
the quantum of doubt necessary to preclude going forward.
And the reason "Justice Is Not for Chickens" is that it does require taking some chances. Honest inquiry into racial issues is never
easy. Foregoing the strike diminishes the likelihood that racial prejudice will aid in winning your case; sometimes it may even increasethe
likelihood that bias, racial or otherwise, will obstruct the fair evaluation of your case. It seems to me, however, that if a case is so marginal that the effect of one doubtful juror is likely to be dispositive, the
case should not have been prosecuted at all, at least not without further investigation. If a case cannot stand examination by twelve jurors
who fairly represent the community, it should fail. Even if adherence
to the "Justice is More than Foul Rules" standard leads to a few hung
juries, or even a few more acquittals in marginal cases, this is as it
should be. (And if race relations are so bad in a jurisdiction that adherence to these standards produces more than a few wrongful acquittals, it is time for everyone to know about it.)
As for judges, after compliance with constitutional rights and
legal rules, justice is supposed to be the only thing. For a trial judge,
adherence to the "Justice is More than Foul Rules" means "When in
doubt, ask more questions." If uncertain that a prosecutor has told
the truth about a prior strike of a white juror, a trial judge can ask for
the voir dire notes from that case. If dubious that use of a racially
charged trait is necessary, she can ask the prosecutor to explain the
infirmities of a substitute. If she has not herself seen evidence of a
hostile attitude, she can ask the prosecutor for supporting details and
then ask court personnel if they observed them.
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These actions are not likely to make a judge popular with prosecutors, at least not in the beginning. It takes courage to take racial
issues seriously, and more courage to do so openly. But asking questions and demanding real responses before approving strikes is part of
setting the right climate in the courtroom, a task that every good trial
judge recognizes as part of his job. It will get easier as lawyers come
to know what to expect; it may be helpful to tell new lawyers what the
expectations are.
An ethical judge need not condemn racism every time he disallows a strike, nor should he allow his actions to be characterized as
calling the prosecutor a racist. Discussions of good faith and an attorney's character will rarely be useful, for it is quite possible that a good
prosecutor will make a bad challenge. Bad challenges may flow from
overzealousness, mistake, or unconscious stereotyping, as well as from
consciously hostile attitudes. Even believing that the prosecutor has
done the best she can, the ethical trial judge should independently
assess and pursue justice.
Legislators could make the task of the good prosecutor and trial
judge easier by commanding these rules. They should do so, but that
is another article, and hardly a reason for either prosecutors or trial
judges to postpone consideration of their own ethical obligations.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Some day, the enormous body of Batson case law and the reams
of commentary may look bizarre. Why did anyone think that the race
of the jurors was so important? I hope my children live to see the day,
not because I expect them to be tried for criminal offenses, but because the world would be a very different place if race really did not

matter in a criminal trial. Until that day, good prosecutors and trial
judges have the power and the obligation to minimize racial discrimination in jury selection and jury deliberations: the power to "Do the
right thing." Unless they exercise that power, they further delay the

day when, blissfully, none of this will matter.

